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Physical theories, for the most part, should be understood as mod-
elling isolated subsystems of a larger Universe; doing so, among other
benefits, greatly clarifies the interpretation of the dynamical symmetries
of those theories. I provide a detailed framework for analysing the sub-
system structure of physical theories and applying it to the interpretation
of their symmetries: the core concept is subsystem-recursivity, whereby
interpretative conclusions about a sector of a theory can be deduced from
considering subsystems of other models of the same theory. I illustrate
the framework by extensive examples from nonrelativistic particle me-
chanics, and in particular from Newtonian theories of gravity. A sequel
to the paper will apply the framework to the local and global symmetries
of classical field theory.
1 Introduction: Symmetry and the Cosmologi-
cal Assumption
[I]t is not often that experiments are done under the stars. Rather
they are done in a room. Although it is physically reasonable that
the walls have no effect, it is true that the original problem is set up
as an idealisation.
Richard Feynman.1
Take a dynamical symmetry of a theory — translational symmetry in New-
tonian mechanics, say, or phase symmetry in the complex Klein-Gordon theory.
Here are four theses2 one might defend about the symmetry:
1. The unobservability thesis: symmetry-variant features of a theory are un-
observable.
1Feynman and Hibbs (1965, p.94).
2I draw all four from Wallace (2019b), where each is discussed in more detail.
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2. The representational equivalence thesis: symmetry-related models of a
theory are equally apt to represent a given state of a given physical system.
3. The modal equivalence thesis: given a model used to represent a system,
any other model obtained from the first by a symmetry transformation
re-represents the same system in the same state, rather than a different
possible state of that system.
4. The surplus structure thesis: mathematical structure used in the state-
ment of a theory, but variant under the symmetries of that theory, should
not be thought of as representing anything physically significant.
All four are contentious, and all four have been extensively discussed in the
recent literature. To give a sample of the issues raised:
• If the notion of symmetry under consideration is indeed dynamical — that
is, a symmetry is a transformation that takes solutions of the equations
of motion to other such solutions — then it is not easy to see why this
no-doubt-practically-useful fact about a theory should have implications
for what is observable, or what is physically real. (Hence Ismael and van
Fraassen (2003), Allori et al (2008), and Dasgupta (2016) all replace or
supplement the dynamical definition of symmetry with a definition that
makes direct reference to what is observable.)
• The notion of dynamical symmetry seems far too liberal for us to accept
the representational equivalence thesis without qualification. All manner
of physical systems admit symmetries which pre-theoretically clearly do
not relate representationally equivalent models (for instance, the Lenz-
Runge symmetry of the two-body problem includes symmetries which
change the shape of a body’s orbit; the conformal symmetries of vacuum
electromagnetism can change the wavelength of an electromagnetic wave).
As Ismael and van Fraassen (2003) and Belot (2013) argue at length, again
we seem to need some substantial restriction in the definition of ‘symme-
try’.
• Philosophers have generally adopted an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to modal
equivalence: most philosophers who have defended some form of the doc-
trine (see, e. g. , Saunders (2003)) have defended it for all symmetries, and
the view that ‘local’ symmetries like the diffeomorphism symmetry uni-
formly obey Modal Equivalence is close to orthodoxy. But as Belot (2018)
points out, this does not conform to physics usage: physicists normally
regard ‘global’ symmetries as generating real physical differences, while
local symmetries do in some circumstances and not in others, according
to what their form is at spatial infinity.
The vast majority of these discussions — as with the vast majority of all dis-
cussions of theory interpretation in philosophy of physics — tacitly or explicitly
make two interpretative assumptions:
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The Fundamentality Assumption: The primary way to understand a phys-
ical theory is to suppose that it is exactly true and represents the deep-
est features of reality. Interpretations based on the assumption that the
theory is approximate, or otherwise non-fundamental are secondary and
derivative on the primary understanding, or else of merely instrumental
significance.
The Cosmological Assumption: The primary way to understand a physical
theory is to suppose that it models the entire universe. Interpretations
based on the assumption that the theory models a finite subsystem of a
larger universe are secondary and derivative on the primary understand-
ing, or else of merely instrumental significance.
The Fundamentality Assumption is ubiquitous in philosophy of science (con-
sider van Fraassen’s (1980, p.8) influential definition of realism: “acceptance of
a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true”) and widely assumed in
philosophy of physics. To give a few examples (mostly borrowed from a more
extensive list collected by Williams (2019): “Whatever else it means to interpret
a scientific theory, it means saying what the world would have to be like if the
theory is true” (Earman 2004, p.1234); “To interpret a theory is to describe the
possible worlds about which it is the literal truth” (Belot 1998, p.532); “The
content of a theory is given by that set of worlds of which the theory is true”.
(Ruetsche 2011, p.6).
The Fundamentality Assumption leads to trouble in the interpretation of
physical theories, for instance in quantum field theory (as discussed in Williams,
ibid) and in the quantum measurement problem (Wallace 2018). But in this
paper I will be concerned more with the Cosmological Assumption, in particular
in the context of theories set on a (background or dynamical) spacetime, where
the assumption amounts to supposing that the theory should in the first instance
be understood as a theory of the entire spacetime. It is not fully independent
from the Fundamentality Assumption: to understand a theory as modelling a
proper subsystem is to accept that the theory is not in itself a full account of
reality and must be embedded in some larger theory if the relation between the
subsystem and its surroundings is to be understood. It is somewhat less common
to see it stated explicitly, but it plays a large role in, e. g. , discussions of the
ontology of quantum mechanics (where talk of ‘the wavefunction of the Universe’
is common and the wavefunction of subsystems is secondary and derivative; see
in this context Albert (1996) and the various contributions to Ney and Albert
(2013)), and in considerations of Leibniz shifts, of background independence,
and of the Hole Argument in the philosophy of spacetime (for instance, see
Belot (2011, p.2866) for an explicit restriction of the discussion to theories of
the whole universe).
To see what is wrong with both assumptions, let’s consider the example of
N -particle classical mechanics. We can’t even ask what the world would be like
according to this theory unless we know the value of N . Sometimes (mostly
in discussions of the interpretation of quantum mechanics) it’s suggested that
we should take N to be the number of elementary particles in the observable
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Universe (depending on how you count, ∼ 1070). But it’s opaque what the mo-
tivation for that is: in the actual Universe those elementary particles are mostly
highly-relativistic particles with irreducibly quantum dynamics, so the fictional
Universe in which there are exactly that many particles but they obey Newto-
nian equations of motion has little or nothing to do with the actual Universe.
But in any case, none of the actual uses of Newtonian particle mechanics
in physics assume either that N ∼ 1070, or that the ‘particles’ are elementary.
The classic applications of the theory took the ‘particles’ to be planets, moons
or comets, and N to be 2 (for the Earth-Moon system, or for a body orbiting
the Sun), or to be the number of planets in the Solar system; more modern
applications (given access to modern computers) might take the ‘particles’ to
be stars, or galaxies, or agglomerations thereof and so take N to be in the
millions or billions. It’s clear that in all these applications, (a) the ‘particles’
do not represent elementary particles, but represent the collective degrees of
freedom of larger bodies; (b) the theory is being applied to some subsystem
of the universe. Furthermore, the fact that N is a freely-choosable variable
in Newtonian physics is useful in applications of the theory precisely because
we want to apply it to different physical systems with different numbers of
constituents.
That being the case, there is no obvious naturalistic motivation to under-
stand Newtonian mechanics in the first instance as an exactly-true theory of an
entire Universe, rather than seeking an understanding of the theory where its
models are to be understood as models of isolated subsystems. And from that
perspective, the fact that the environments of those systems have been removed
to infinity is an idealisation, not something to be understood in physical terms.
In considering the epistemology and metaphysics of symmetry, whether or
not we adopt the Cosmological Assumption has major implications. Notably:
1. Observations are physical processes, but they are not normally modelled
explicitly within the system being studied, but are considered as exter-
nal interventions. And then it becomes relatively easy to see when the
presence of a dynamical symmetry has implications for observability of
physical quantities: it can do so when the symmetry can be extended so as
to apply also to the dynamics of those interventions.
2. The modal equivalence thesis has a rather metaphysical — even esoteric
— character when it is applied to models of the entire Universe (as can
be seen by the recent literature, with its discussion of counterparts, haec-
citism and the like. Even Belot’s (2018) naturalistic argument against
unrestricted Equivalence is largely a matter of conventionalism and con-
ceptual analysis: the reason we should reject unrestricted Equivalence is
that most physicists do and they ought to be taken as authoritative as to
what their words mean. But when applied to subsystems of the Universe,
it becomes relatively simple to understand these modal questions in more
directly empirical terms: is a situation where the symmetry transforma-
tion is applied to this system, but not to other systems, the same as or
different from the original situation?
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(I should note that the idea that transformations to subsystems give rise to
modally, and indeed empirically, distinct states of affairs is widely recognised
and has been extensively discussed: see, e. g. , Brown and Sypel (1995), Healey
(2009), Greaves and Wallace (2014), and Belot (2018). But for the most part
these discussions still adhere to the Cosmological Assumption in that they take
for granted the physical theories should in the first instance be understood as
modelling the whole Universe, with the application of symmetry transformations
to subsystems having a derivative character. This is fairly explicit in Belot’s,
and Greaves and Wallace’s, papers.)
A major assumption of this paper is that the interpretative questions of
symmetry cannot meaningfully be answered as long as we adhere to the Cos-
mological Assumption, because their answers depend not just on how the sym-
metry applies to the system itself but on whether and how it can be extended
to surrounding or distant systems. In a companion paper (Wallace 2019b), in-
deed, I explore this at length and offer arguments for (partial versions of) the
Unobservability, Representational Equivalence, Surplus Structure, and Modal
Equivalence theses, depending in each case on just how a symmetry extends
from a system to other systems.
In this paper, though, I am concerned with a slightly different puzzle. The at-
traction of symmetry-based arguments is that they start with something formal
— the notion of a transformation, perhaps of a certain formally-characterised
kind, that leaves the dynamics invariant — and draw substantive, interpretative
conclusions from that formal feature. This is striking (so striking, indeed, as to
have aroused suspicion: Dasgupta (2016) and Møller-Nielsen (2017) can both
be read as voicing this suspicion). But if instead the interpretative significance
of a symmetry depends on questions of how that symmetry extends beyond
the system — questions which, it might seem, definitionally cannot depend on
formal features of the system — then the striking feature seems mostly lost.
Remarkably, this is not the case, at least not for a great many theories of
contemporary relevance. This is because these theories have the remarkable and
underappreciated feature of being able to reinterpret subsystems of their models,
when dynamically isolated, as other models of the same theory. Or put the other
way around: a given theory’s models can be interpreted, in idealisation, as
representing subsystems of other, more complicated, models of the same theory.
I call theories with this feature subsystem-recursive: given a subsystem-recursive
theory, we can draw conclusions about the proper subsystems of a given model
from a consideration of its dynamics, and then read those conclusions over to
other models of that same system in their entirety.
The purpose of the paper, then, is twofold: to give a more precise definition of
subsystem-recursivity, and to use it to give a systematic framework for answer-
ing questions of modal equivalence and observability for theories with differing
symmetry groups. (The resultant framework can be seen as a development of
the earlier framework that Greaves and I developed in previous work(Greaves
and Wallace 2014).) It is the first of two papers on the topic: this paper focuses
on the general concept of subsystem-recursivity and on examples drawn from
nonrelativistic particle mechanics. The sequel (Wallace 2019a) considers the
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more technically complex case of local and global symmetries in field theory, in
which context the basic ideas remain valid but considerable subtleties develop.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 I develop the idea of
a ‘sector’ of a theory as a subclass of models of that theory intended to model
different possible states of the same system (whereas a theory, understood more
broadly, also can be used to model many different systems), and then introduce
the key idea of subsystem-recursivity. In sections 3–4 I introduce a general
framework for discussing the subsystems of a (sector of a) theory, and then
develop the appropriate notion of dynamical symmetry within that framework.
In the remainder of the paper sections I carry out an extended exploration of
the related notions of symmetry and subsystem-recursivity in the context of
non-relativistic particle theories in general (section 5) and of various forms of
Newtonian gravity in particular (section 6). Section 7 is the conclusion.
As for notation: Roman indices (raised or lowered) range from 1 to 3, and
normally denote components of 3-spatial vectors; repeated indices are summed
over; indices can be lowered or raised at will (so that xi = xi). 3-spatial vectors
themselves are denoted with arrow superscripts, as in ~x.
2 Theories, sectors, and subsystem recursivity
The term ‘theory’, at least in physical practice, is ambiguous between various
elements of a complex hierarchy. Take the case of N -particle mechanics: here,
in ascending order of generality, ‘theory’ might refer to
1. N -particle mechanics with a specific value of N (say N = 2), a specific
form of the force law between the N particles (say, a Newtonian inverse-
square force, defined by a potential
Vij(r) = −Gmimj/r (1)
where r is the interparticle distance between particles i and j, mi and mj
are their masses, and G = 6.67 × 10−11kg−1m3s−2), and specific choices
of the parameters for the particles, in this case their masses (say, m1 =
1.99× 1030kg, m2 = 5.97× 1024kg).
2. N -particle mechanics where the force law is held fixed, but now the number
N of particles as well as the individual particles’ parameters (masses, in
the gravitational case) can vary between models.
3. N -particle mechanics where the parameters in the force law are allowed
to vary (so that G can take on different values).
4. N -particle mechanics where even the functional form of the force law varies
between models (in some models it might be a Coulombic force law where
the particles are assigned charges as well as masses; in another it might
include an external, frictional force law).
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Similarly, if our theory is (classical) complex scalar field theory, ‘the theory’
might be understood as including a (1) specific choice of Lagrangian, parameters
in the Lagrangian, and boundary conditions; or it might permit (2) models
with different boundary conditions; or (3) models with different coefficients in
the Lagrangian; or (4) models with different functional forms in the Lagrangian.
(And even this is not the top of the hierarchy: if I had instead spoken of ‘classical
field theory’, then different models could differ even in their degrees of freedom.)
All of these uses of ‘theory’ have value in some contexts: those contexts can
usefully be understood by considering the sorts of modality that the different
models represent. In case (1), different models represent different possible dy-
namical histories of a given system: in my particular example: the Earth-Sun
system. Given a model that represents the actual way the Earth-Sun system is,
other models represent the way it would be given different initial conditions (but
without moving outside the space of dynamics described by the theory itself by,
for instance, ablating matter off the Earth). In cases (2), for the most part we
are not talking about physical modality: different models represent different, re-
lated systems, themselves actual or possible. If we change m2 to 7.35× 1022 kg,
now we have a class of models suitable for representing the Earth-Moon system;
if we change N to 9 and adjust the masses appropriately, we have a class of
models suitable for representing all the planets of the Solar system. In case (3),
different models for the most part represent different possible ways the whole
world might be: when we imagine changing G to some larger number we are dis-
cussing a counterfactual for the whole Universe, not describing a system which
for all we know obtains elsewhere in the Milky Way.3 In case (4) the same is
largely true but we will also have models suitable for describing completely dif-
ferent systems with completely different interpretations of the model (as when
we change from Newtonian gravity to Coulombic electrostatics, for instance.)
For my purposes, the relevant levels of generality are (2) and, derivatively,
(1). A ‘theory’, in the sense relevant for my purposes, has many classes of
models which are candidates to represent many different systems, but all of
those systems describe the same sorts of entities evolving under the same dy-
namics. So in Newtonian gravity, a theory is specified by the force law and the
coefficients in that law; in scalar field theory, by a Lagrangian and its coeffi-
cients. Borrowing one precisification of the somewhat-inconsistent conventions
of physics, I’ll say that a sector of a theory is a (maximal) sub-class of models
all of which are candidates to represent different histories of the same system:
so in Newtonian gravity, a sector is determined by a choice of particle number
and an assignment of a mass to each particle; in scalar field theory, a sector
is determined by a choice of boundary conditions. Borrowing from the latter,
I’ll say that ‘boundary conditions’ are by definition what individuates sectors:
this has its normal meaning in field theory, though it can sound a little odd in
particle mechanics to regard a mass as part of a boundary condition (it might
seem more natural if one thinks of the ‘condition’ as being imposed at some
3The situation is complicated by the fact that these parameters are dimensionful, so that
changes in G could also be interpreted as changes of units.
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initial time, when whatever physical process that brought the system into being
— planetary coalescence, say — determined those parameters).
In both of these theories, there is a natural way to speak of a sector’s subsys-
tems: a subsystem of an N -sector of particle mechanics is a collection M ≤ N of
the particles, perhaps over some restricted time; a subsystem of a sector of field
theory is the restriction of the fields to some well-behaved subset of spacetime.
(I will be more precise about these definitions in due course.) It will not in gen-
eral be possible to give a dynamics for a subsystem in isolation, for the obvious
reason that other parts of the larger system may influence the subsystem. But
for a given model, it might be that some subsystems are dynamically isolated,
in the sense that we can give an autonomous dynamics for the subsystem in
isolation, with the background conditions as set by that model and independent
to some degree from distant variations in the rest of the system.
The notion is easier to illustrate through examples than to define precisely.
As a concrete illustration, consider Coulombic electrostatics.4 A sector of this
theory is given by N masses m1, . . .mN (all positive real numbers), by N charges
q1, . . . qN , and by a boundary condition Φ(∞, t) (a smooth real function from
R to R). Within each sector, the kinematic models are ordered N -tuples of
trajectories xi1, . . . x
i




xiJ(t) = qJ∇iΦ(xiJ(t), t) (2)
where Φ(x, t) is the unique solution to the equation




subject to the boundary condition lim|x|→∞ Φ(x, t) = Φ(∞, t).
Pro tem, we can define a subsystem by a subset M ≤ N of the trajectories
(in section 3 it will be convenient to adjust this definition slightly, to allow for
subsystems of finite temporal extent) but the definition does not, in itself, say
anything about whether the subsystem has its own dynamics. However, suppose
we now consider a dynamical model in an N -particle sector, in which there is
some sub-region R and some subset M < N of particles which remain (over some
time period) well inside R, while the other N −M particles remain outside R;
and suppose that as we approach the boundary ∂R of R, Φ(x, t) tends to some
spatially-constant value Φ(∂R, t). This could happen, for instance, because the
other N −M particles are very far from R, or because positive and negative
charges outside R approximately balance so as to exert little net Couloumb
force within R. Then to a good approximation, we can study the dynamics of
the subsystem of those M particles autonomously from the other N −M : they
will behave as if those particles were not present and as if the M particles were
interacting among themselves according to the appropriate M -particle sector
4Why not gravitation? The equivalence principle makes the notion of ‘isolated subsystem’
distinctly subtle in a gravitational theory, so I postpone further discussion of this case until
section 6.
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dynamics. If we want to study the dynamics of that subsystem of particles, in
other words, under these assumptions and if we are sufficiently tolerant of small
errors, we can replace the full N -particle sector with the M -particle sector. In
this sense, the latter can be interpreted as modelling an isolated subsystem of
the former.
Conversely, given the original N -particle sector, there will be many ways of
embedding those N particles in a larger K-particle sector, with the remaining
K − N particles arranged so as to ensure the potential at the boundary of
some region surrounding the N particles is approximately constant. In fact,
Coulombic electrostatics has these two features:
(i) Any sector of the theory can be interpreted as an idealised description of
an isolated subsystems of a sector of the theory;
(ii) An isolated subsystem of any sector of the theory can described, in ideal-
isation, as a sector of the theory.
I will call a theory with these two features subsystem-recursive: these are sys-
tems where any model can be interpreted in the first instance as modelling a
dynamically isolated subsystem under certain idealizations about its environ-
ment and where, if we want to remove those idealizations, we can embed the
model in a model of a larger system within the same theory — and where that
larger system in turn is interpretable in the first instance as a subsystem of a
still-larger system, with no assumption that we need to understand the whole
setup in terms of an ur -system that describes the whole Universe. The nat-
ural interpretation of a sector of a subsystem-recursive theory is always as a
subsystem of some larger whole.
Before considering any more examples of subsystem-recursive theories, thirdly
subtleties are worth considering. Firstly, I have given no general definition of
‘isolated’ system. It’s tempting to try something like ‘subsystem where the
causal influences of other particles are negligible’ or ‘subsystem where all the
particles are very far from other particles’. But the first brings in metaphys-
ical features that I’d prefer to avoid, and the second is clearly wrong in the
electromagnetic case (it might be, e.g, that there are very many relatively-close
particles, but positive and negative charges cancel out). A necessary condition
of isolation is dynamical autonomy: that is, we can write down closed-form
equations of motion for the subsystem that, to a good degree of approxima-
tion, govern the dynamics of its constituents, with the details of the rest of the
system irrelevant except insofar as they do or do not satisfy the isolation con-
dition. But beyond that, I think it’s unlikely to be fruitful to look for a sharp
definition of ‘isolated’: a theory is subsystem-recursive if there is some robust,
useful, category of dynamically-autonomous subsystems to which the definition
applies.
The point can be sharpened by expanding Coulombic electrostatics to in-
clude theories with boundary conditions of the form
lim
|x|→∞
Φ(x, t) = ai(t)x
i + Φ0(t) (4)
9
for arbitary time-dependent vector ai(t). Now, the class of ‘isolated’ systems can
be taken to include subsets of particles in regions where the electric field (that
is, the gradient of the potential) is constant on the boundary of the region (as
would be appropriate in modelling the space between the plates of a capacitor,
for instance). This expanded theory remains subsystem-recursive, and arguably
is an improvement on the previous formulation of electrodynamics inasmuch
as it applies to a wider variety of dynamically-autonomous systems, but the
charged particles in a strong electric field are not ‘isolated’ from that field in
any intuitive sense of ‘isolated’. (Nonetheless I will retain the term: in most of
the cases I discuss in this paper, the intuitive meaning remains roughly correct.)
Secondly, there is some vagueness in my criterion for when a subsystem
counts as isolated, and when it can be modelled by another sector of the theory.
This is unavoidable: dynamical autonomy is by its nature relative to the desired
degree of accuracy, the timescale over which the system is to be studied, and po-
tentially the range of interventions to be considered. I want to suggest that this
is just part of the normal modelling practice of physics: the idealised subsys-
tem and the larger system both have fairly precise mathematical descriptions,
but the use of approximations in relating them is imprecise and to some extent
an art as much as a science. Of course, if there is ever real doubt whether a
subsystem is accurately modelled by its fully-isolated idealisation, the question
can be answered by solving the equations of motion for the full system — but
by the time that has been done, the advantages of using the idealisation are
substantially diminished.
There is a close analogy here to the use of higher-level theories in physics
(cf (Wallace 2012, ch.2) and references therein): there too, the higher-level and
lower-level theories are typically both sharply defined in themselves, but the
criteria under which the lower-level theory is said to instantiate the higher-
level one are inexact and dependent on context and timescales. There too, we
say that the higher-level theory only gets things right ceteris paribus, and the
conditions for the validity of the ceteris paribus clause cannot be conclusively
checked within the higher-level theory but require us to descend to the lower
level.5
Thirdly (though relatedly) I say that a subsystem is represented by another
sector of the theory, rather than just by some model in another sector, because
it is crucial that the modal properties of the subsystem are represented: we
care about the dynamical equations of the subsystem, not just about its ac-
tual occurrent features. But of course there will be a limit to which models in
the sector actually succeed in representing the subsystem: if we consider states
where the subsystem constituents lie well outside the original region R, so that
they interact with the rest of the system in a way which violates the assump-
tions in the approximation, then those states no longer succeed in representing
possible states of that subsystem — at least not qua isolated subsystem of the
system. As with the issues of approximation we considered previously, it is
5See Reutlinger, Schurz, and Hu¨tteman (2019) and references therein for extensive further
discussion.
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inaccessible within a sector just when this occurs, because the external details
that determine it have been idealized to infinity.
This, in turn, is a caveat for any would-be interpreter of a model. The details
of that model should be taken as representing the physical goings-on of a sys-
tem only relatively close to the action, so to speak. A model of some interacting
particles, for instance, strictly speaking describes space outside the region occu-
pied by those particles as empty, but it would be a mistake — a version of the
Cosmological Assumption — to suppose that the theory really represents an in-
finity of empty space around the particles. In realistic applications of a physical
theory, ‘at infinity’ does not mean ‘literally infinitely far away’: it means, more
mundanely, something like ‘well outside the region that the model is describing’.
(A particularly striking example due to Porter Williams (in conversation): par-
ticle physicists analyse the particles produced by a collision process ‘at infinity’
— but the tube of the Large Hadron Collider is 3.8 meters across.6 )
This definition of subsystem-recursivity is only preliminary: there is an in-
timate connection between subsystem-recursivity and symmetry, and so I now
pause to develop the framework for symmetry that I use in this paper.
3 Subsystem structure and symmetries
A key feature of the theories I discuss in this paper and its sequel is their rich
subsystem structure, and it will be useful to discuss this at quite a high level
of abstraction. Let me define a subsystem structure as a collection X of objects
(the subsystems) equipped with a relation ⊂ (where X ⊂ Y should be read as
‘X is a subsystem of Y ’), obeying these assumptions:
• Partial ordering: ⊂ is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.
• Minimal element: there is some subsystem (written ∅) satisfying ∅ ⊂ X
for all X ∈ X .
• Maximal element: there is some subsystem (written X in a mild abuse of
notation) satisfying X ⊂ X for all X ∈ X .
Two subsystems X,Y are disjoint if Z ⊂ X,Z ⊂ Y implies Z = ∅.
Each sector of a particle theory can be interpreted as defining a subsystem
structure: in an N -particle sector a subsystem is specified by a pair X = 〈K, I〉,
where K is a subset of {1, . . . N} (identifying the particles to be included in
the subsystem) and I is a subset of R (identifying the period of time for which
the subsystem describes those particles). Given subsets X1 = 〈K1, I1〉, X2 =
〈K2, I2〉, X1 ⊂ X2 iff (i) X2 describes all the particles that X1 does, K1 ⊂ K2,
and (ii) the set of times for X1 is a subset of the set for X2, I1 ⊂ I2.
A state structure for a subsystem structure X is then given by:
1. For each X ∈ X , a set S(X), the state space of X, satisfying S(∅) = ∅.
6Evans (2012, p.837).
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2. For each X,Y ∈ X with X ⊂ Y , a map rXY : S(Y ) → S(X), the
restriction of S(Y ) to S(X), satisfying:
• rXX = idX , where idX is just the identity on S(X);
• rXY · rY Z = rXZ .
Given these conditions, the restriction from Y to X can be consistently
written as x→ x|X , since (x|Y )|X = x|X .7
I impose one further requirement on this setup:
Upwards consistency: Given X ⊂ Y and x ∈ S(X), there is some y ∈ S(Y )
with y|X = x.
(A brief note for readers familiar with the earlier framework for symmetries
that I developed, jointly with Hilary Greaves, in Greaves and Wallace (2014):
this framework differs (i) by allowing consideration of a plurality of different
subsystems, rather than operating with a once-and-for all distinction between
‘subsystem’ and ‘environment’; and (ii) by dropping the assumption that the
total system ought to be thought of as representing the whole Universe.)
It will often be useful to talk about physical quantities for a subsystem: a
quantity for X, by definition, is just a map from S(X) to some other space T .
For instance, a property is defined by T = {0, 1}, or T = {True,False} if you
prefer. A real-valued quantity requires T = R, and so on. Physical quantities
for X do not restrict to subsystems of X, because the value of the quantity
might depend on details of the state that are erased by restriction to X. They
do have natural extensions from X to any Y with X ⊂ Y : the extension f˜ of f
from X to Y is defined by f˜(y) = f(y|X).
In a particle theory, a state of the subsystem 〈K, I〉 is a smooth map from
K × I to R3: put another way, it is an assignment, for each particle covered
by the subsystem, of a path in R3 defined for all times in I. The restriction
map is restriction in the ordinary functional sense. At this point, a note of
terminology: subsystems in this context are four-dimensional entities, so that
a ‘state’ of such a subsystem is a specification of its physical properties over
an extended period of time. This notion of ‘state’ should be contrasted with
the dynamical notion that arises when we talk about ‘state space’ and the like,
and in which the dynamics of a system evolves one state into another. (In some
ways ‘history’ would be clearer than ‘state’, but it is cumbersome.)
Continuing with the abstract presentation: given subsystems X, Y , and
states x ∈ S(X), y ∈ S(Y ), there may or not be a state z ∈ S(X ) with
Z|X = x, Z|Y = y. If there is, I say that x and y are compatible. X and Y are
disconnected if any x ∈ S(X) and y ∈ S(Y ) are compatible. When systems are
contiguous — that is, disjoint, but not disconnected — there are compatibility
7For readers who don’t think I’m being abstract enough, here’s an alternative definition:
the subsystem structure X is a poset category with ⊂ as its morphisms; a state structure is
a contravariant functor from X to Set. (cf, e. g. , Awodey (2010)).
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constraints on states in those systems. (Except in pathological cases, discon-
nectedness clearly implies disjointness, since x, y will not be compatible if their
restrictions to a common subset of X and Y differ.)
In particle theory, for an example of disjoint but non-disconnected subsys-
tems, take X = 〈K, (0, 1)〉 and Y = 〈K, (−1, 0)〉: the smoothness requirement
on states requires states of the two subsystems to agree in a neighborhood of
t = 0 to be compatible. (Conversely, it is easy to see that two particle-theory
subsystems 〈K1, I1〉 and 〈K2, I2〉 are disconnected iff either K1, K2 are disjoint
or the closures of I1, I2 are disjoint.)
A symmetry group for X is then an assignment, to each X, of a group G(X)
in the algebraic sense, along with a homomorphism rXY from G(Y ) to G(X),
satisfying the same composition, locality and upwards consistency axioms as
for state structures. (Hence, we can consistently write g|X for the restriction
of a group element to X). And an action of that symmetry group on a state
structure is a group-theoretic action RX of each G(X) on S(X) such that
RX(g|X) = RX (g)|X . (5)
In keeping with usual physics conventions, I will take the action of the group
as tacit unless context demands otherwise, and, if x ∈ S(X), will write gx for
RX(g)x. Given a group element g ∈ G(X), for any Y with X ⊂ Y there will
exist some (possibly non-unique) g˜ ∈ G(Y ) with g˜|X = g; I call any such g˜ a lift
of g to Y .
For any given x ∈ X, the isotropy group of x (sometimes called the stabilizer
group) is the subset of G(X) whose elements leave x invariant. Normally speak-
ing, the isotropy group of a state is trivial except for extremely special choices
of state: for that reason, I define state as generic if it has trivial isotropy group.
For particle theories, the symmetries come in two classes: spacetime symme-
tries, where some fixed (but possibly time-dependent) transformation is applied
to each particle trajectory, and permutation symmetries, where some of the
trajectories (in fact, always trajectories with the same masses and other param-
eters) are exchanged. The general form of a spacetime symmetry is
~xI(t)→ Ft(~xI(f(t))) (6)
where Ft is a family of bijections of R3, and f is a bijection of R; the general
form of a permutation symmetry is
~xI(t)→ ~xσ(I)(t) (7)
where σ is some permutation of particle indices, normally required to satisfy
some further constraints. For Coulombic particle theory, for instance, the space-
time symmetries have the form
~xI(t)→ R~xI(±t− τ) + ~s+ ~ut (8)
for arbitrary real τ , arbitrary vectors ~s, ~u, and arbitrary orthogonal matrix R,
and the permutation symmetries include all permutations between particles of
the same masses and charges, as well as all permutations that swap particles
with charge +q to charge −q.
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4 Symmetry and discernibility for subsystems
Let’s see how this framework can be used to interpret the symmetries of en-
tire systems, via subsystem-recursivity. The basic interpretative assumption I
make about symmetries is that when two states of a subsystem are related by
a symmetry, they are identical in their intrinsic properties, so that any change
caused by the symmetry at most changes a system’s extrinsic properties, i. e. its
relation to other systems. (And I assume that our description does not contain
redundancy beyond that encoded in symmetries, so that the converse is true:
any two states not related by a symmetry are differ in their intrinsic properties.)
This reading of symmetry is fairly common (see Healey (2009) for an explicit
statement of it) and I defend it at length, for dynamical symmetries, in Wallace
(2019b); here I take it as a posit.
The framework we have developed now allows us to give a criterion for when
a symmetry changes a system’s extrinsic properties. For suppose X and Y are
disjoint subsystems, with states x and y that are compatible: that is, such that
some state z of the total system satisfies z|X = x, z|Y = y. And suppose that
a symmetry g ∈ G(X) takes x to some x′ = gx which is also compatible with
y, with some z′ satisfying z′|X = x′, z′Y = y. Do any such z, z′ differ by some
intrinsic property? Yes — provided that there is no symmetry g˜ ∈ G with
g˜z = z′.
We can codify this into the following set of definitions: for any two x, x′ ∈
S(X):
• x′ is intrinsically discernible from x if there is no symmetry g ∈ G(X)
such that x′ = gx.
• x′ is extrinsically discernible from x if there is some Y , and some y ∈ S(Y ),
such that any two x˜, x˜′ with x˜|X = x, x˜′|X = x′, x˜|Y = x˜′|Y = y are
intrinsically discernible, i. e. are unrelated by any g ∈ G. In this case, y is
a witness to their extrinsic discernibility.
• x, x′ are indiscernible if they are neither intrinsically nor extrinsically dis-
cernible
If a subsystem Y contains generic states (that is: states which are invariant
only under the identity idY of G(Y )), we can give a useful general criterion for
when states of Y can witness the extrinsic discernability of states x, gx ∈ S(X).
Call g Y-local if it has a lift g˜ whose restriction to Y is the identity, g˜|Y = idY .
In this case, no state of Y can witness the discernability of x, gx. Conversely,
if g has no such lift, then provided X,Y are disconnected (so that any state of
Y is guaranteed compatible with both x and gx), any generic state of Y will
witness the discernability of x, gx.
To apply this framework meaningfully, we need to require that the subsystem
under consideration is small enough that we can regard the rest of the system
as a reasonable proxy for all of its environment. For particle theory, we can
consider a subsystem 〈K, I〉 to be small if (i) K contains a proper subset of all
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the particle labels; (ii) I is bounded. (So: a subsystem is small if it excludes
some of the particles, and extends only over some finite time interval.)
We can also work at the level of quantities rather than states. Given a
system X, a quantity for X is just a function f : X → T , for some ‘target’ space
T . (For instance, if f is a property, the target space is {0, 1}, or if you prefer
{T, F}; if f is a real-valued quantity, T = R.) A quantity f is:
• intrinsic if whenever x′ = gx for g ∈ G(X), f(x′) = f(x); or, equivalently,
if f · g = f for all g ∈ G(X).
• extrinsic if it is not intrinsic, but whenever x′ and x are indiscernible,
f(x′) = f(x).
• gauge if f(x′) 6= f(x) for x, x′ indiscernible.
Where a theory includes gauge quantities, it is descriptively redundant: some
of its states do not differ in any physically-relevant way and yet are mathemati-
cally represented as distinct. (Again, it only makes sense to apply this analysis
directly for small subsystems.)
5 Symmetry and discernibility for general par-
ticle theories
Let’s apply this framework to particle theories: given some subsystem X =
〈K, I〉 of a sector of a particle theory, and two states x, gx ∈ S(X) related by
a symmetry g ∈ G(X), when are x and gx extrinsically discernable? There are
two natural choices of witness to their extrinsic discernability: either (i) some
disjoint set of particles at the same time, or (ii) the same set of particles at
a distinct time. These correspond respectively to (i) a subsystem 〈K ′, I〉 with
K ∩ K ′ = ∅, and (ii) a subsystem 〈K, I ′〉 with I, I ′ having disjoint closure.
Following Wallace (2019b), a symmetry g ∈ G(〈K, I〉) is subsystem-local iff it is
Y -local for any Y = 〈K ′, I〉 with K,K ′ disjoint, and time-local iff it is Y -local
for any Y = 〈K, I ′〉 with I, I ′ having disjoint closure.
Recall that a spacetime symmetry is defined by a possibly time-dependent
bijection on space points (i. e. , on R3) together with a bijection on times (i. e. ,
on R). Since each bijection is the same for all particles, no spacetime symmetry
is subsystem-local; whether a spacetime symmetry is time-local depends on
whether, and how, it depends on time. Permutation symmetries are subsystem-
local (any permutation of a subset of particles is automatically a permutation of
the whole set of particles) but not time-local (we cannot permute the particles at
one time but not at another, not if we wish the transformation to be a dynamical
symmetry).
As a consequence, any two states related by a (non-trivial) spacetime symme-
try are extrinsically discernable, with any disjoint collection of particles serving
as a witness to the discernability; any two states related by a (non-trivial) per-
mutation symmetry are likewise extrinsically discernable, with those same par-
ticles at an earlier or later time witnessing it. In the case of the Coulomb theory
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we have mostly been discussing so far (whose spacetime symmetry group is the
Galilei group), the spacetime symmetries are also time-local, so that specifying
the symmetry for some set of particles over any time interval suffices to specify
it for that same set over all other time intervals — hence, a particle’s earlier
state also serves to witness the discernability of symmetry-related states. (In
section 6 we will see that this is not always the case for spacetime symmetries.)
So: states differing by any particle-theory symmetry — whether spacetime,
permutation, or a combination thereof — are extrinsically discernible: there are
no distinct-but-indiscernible states in particle mechanics. At the level of quan-
tities: all particle-theory quantities are either intrinsic or extrinsic: there are no
gauge quantities in particle mechanics, and hence no descriptive redundancy.
The core idea of subsystem-recursivity is that we can now apply these con-
clusions to entire sectors of a theory, because those sectors should be interpreted
as describing subsystems of larger systems under the idealisation that the rest
of the system can be neglected. Doing so, we reach the conclusion that all sym-
metries in particle theory should be understood as physical transformations,
taking a model to an indiscernible-yet-distinct model.
It is useful to see how this plays out for the dynamical conception of states
(where states are phase-space points, i. e. specification of all particle positions
and momenta, rather than segments of particle histories). Formally we can
define a subsystem structure on N -particle phase space, with the subsystems
just correspending to subsets of the particles. Under this analysis, spacetime
symmetries of a subsystem X are never X-local, but permutation symmetries
of the subsystem always are.
That gives us good reason to regard spacetime-symmetry-related dynamical
states as intrinsically identical but extrinsically different. The reason has a
direct physical interpretation: the application of a spacetime symmetry to a
subset of the particle states changes their positions and/or velocities relative
to other particles. Given subsystem recursivity, this should be carried over to
symmetries of the whole system, in which those ’other particles’ are idealised to
spatial infinity but not obliterated.
In this context it is interesting to consider the periodic suggestion that in
the presence of a symmetry, the ‘true’ state space is obtained by quotienting
under the action of any symmetries. This can be done in particle mechanics
(the general process is known as dynamical reduction, or as Marsden-Weinstein
reduction; see Marsden and Ratiu (1999) and references therein for more details)
and does indeed yield a well-defined intrinsic dynamics for the system — but
that dynamics does not encode the change over time of the system’s extrinsic
features, i. e. how it changes relative to the background of other systems. So for
that reason, quotienting is throwing away real information (at least as long as
we reject the Cosmological Assumption in our interpretative practice).
What about the permutation symmetries? Here I think it is a matter of
convention: do we want to define the state space of the theory such that it
encodes the extrinsic permutation-variant properties, or not? As long as we
regard the history state as fundamental and the dynamical state as derivative,
this seems to be up to us: the quotiented description has a certain austere clarity,
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against which the unquotiented description is usually easier to work with. But
nothing factual hangs on this choice.
6 Symmetry and subsytem recursivity for dif-
ferent versions of Newtonian gravity
To explore both this symmetry-based analysis of intrinsic and extrinsic quan-
tities, and the general idea of subsystem recursivity, in this section I want to
consider a number of different formulations of Newtonian gravitation that have
been discussed in the recent literature. Each of these theories fits the general
particle-mechanics mold: each sector has a fixed finite number N of particles,
and a fixed assignment of masses to the particles; each model is specified by
a trajectory ~xI(t) for each particle I. For simplicity, I disregard permutation
symmetries in this part of the paper (they work out the same in each case) and
focus entirely on the spacetime symmetries.
The first example is Newtonian potential gravity. In this theory, sectors are
individuated by particle number and masses, but also by a spatial boundary
condition for a real field Φ on R3 × R, which for the moment I will require to
take the form (previously seen in eqn. ((4)):
lim
|x|→∞
Φ(x, t) = ai(t)x
i + Φ0(t) (9)




xiJ(t) = ∇iΦ(xiJ(t), t) (10)
where Φ(x, t) is the unique solution to the equation




subject to the boundary condition (9). (As usual G is fixed once-and-for-all
and sector-independent; it could be set to 1 by an appropriate choice of units.)
Subsystems are defined just as in the electrostatic theory, but in Newtonian
gravity, the isolated subsystems are freely falling subsystems in which tidal
forces can be neglected, i. e. subsystems where the potential approximates the
form ai(t)x
i + Φ0(t) on the boundary for given ai(t),Φ0(t).
(As with the Coulomb case, it is possible to relax the boundary conditions
to permit a wider class of subsystem. We might, for instance, permit boundary
conditions of the form
lim
|x|→∞
Φ(x, t) = Mij(t)x
ixj + ai(t)x
i + Φ0(t) (12)
in which case the specific boundary condition
lim
|x|→∞











for ~r0 = (r0 cosωt, r0 sinωt, 0) and ω
2 = GM/r0, describes physics in the vicin-
ity of a point in circular orbit distance r0 from a distant mass M . Plausibly more
general quadratic boundary conditions can also be interpreted as subsystems —
but for my purposes the simpler condition (11) suffices.)
The Galilean symmetries are symmetries for this theory, and indeed are the
full set of sector-preserving symmetries, but there is a larger class of symmetries
that relate states in different sectors. Specifically, consider transformations of
form
~xn(t)→ R~xn(t− τ) + ~s(t) (14)
together with changes of boundary condition of form
~a(t)→ ~a(t)− ~¨s(t) (15)
for arbitrary twice-differentiable vector function ~s(t). If ~¨s(t) 6= 0, this corre-
sponds to a time-dependent acceleration imposed on all bodies, together with
a time-dependent, spatially-constant gravitational field sufficient to generate
that acceleration. Let’s call this larger group of symmetries the Maxwell group,
following Earman (1989). It includes the Galilean transformations in the spe-
cial case where ~¨s(t) = 0, and in that case the boundary condition is invariant.
In other cases, it is transformed, but the transformation remains a dynamical
symmetry.
It follows that purely spatial-translation symmetries (i. e. , those with R = id
and τ = 0) are time-local: their form over one time interval does not fix their
form over another time interval, and it does not directly make sense to talk
about where a particle is relative to its own earlier location. However, these
symmetries are not subsystem-local, so that we can regard the symmetries as
changing the extrinsic position and velocity of the system (understood, as usual,
as defined relative to the backdrop of other subsystems). Note also that despite
the presence of a time-dependent symmetry, the theory is deterministic: time-
dependent transformations (other than the Galilean ones) map between different
sectors, but dynamics is defined within a sector.
Let’s pause briefly to consider the direct empirical significance of these var-
ious symmetries (cf Kosso (2000), Brading and Brown (2003), Greaves and
Wallace (2014)). The Galilean symmetries, since they leave the sector invari-
ant, can be understood as transformations of a subsystem that leave the rest of
the system unchanged (at least in the idealisation where dynamical interaction
between subsystems is neglected). The non-Galilean transformations cannot be
so understood: they change the boundary conditions, and so some change in the
surrounding subsystems is required. In this particular case, doing so requires a
modification of the gravitational field in which the subsystem is located. But
the transformation can still be understood in a well-defined way as altering the
extrinsic quantities of the subsystem, because we can use an arbitrary (and in-
deed arbitrarily distant) other subsystem as the reference with respect to which
those quantities are to be understood. Indeed, the existence of this symmetry
is familiar to us: it is simply Einstein’s equivalence principle, stating that an
external gravitational field has no effect on the intrinsic behavior of a system.
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In Greaves and Wallace ibid, we distinguished two classes of scenario that
gave rise to direct empirical significance: Galileo’s ship scenarios, in which the
symmetry could be understood as acting on a subsystem while leaving the rest
of the system unchanged, and Einstein’s elevator scenarios, in which applying
the symmetry also required changes to the system’s surroundings. At least in
the context of particle mechanics (the situation is subtler in field theory, as I
discuss in the sequel), we can give clean conditions for when these arise: in
either case the symmetry must not be be subsystem-local (so that reference
systems exist to witness the change); if such a symmetry is sector-preserving, it
gives rise to Galileo’s-ship scenarios; if it is not sector-preserving, it gives rise
to Einstein’s-elevator scenarios.
We can also identify an alternative form of direct empirical significance,
not much considered in this literature, which occurs when a symmetry is not
time-local: in that case, we can consider the same system before and after
the symmetry transformation is applied to it by some external process (e.g. by
swapping the particles around or by physically rotating the system) and observe
that this physically meaningful change nonetheless makes no difference to the
system’s intrinsic dynamics. (There is actually a reasonable argument that the
historical Galileo’s-ship thought experiment ought to be understood this way,
since after all Galileo does speak of putting the ship into motion; still, the
norm in the current literature is to consider the application of the symmetry
counterfactually rather than temporally.)
For our second example of a Newtonian gravity theory, let’s suppose that
we simply restrict our attention to boundary conditions that are asymptotically
constant. This restricts the symmetry group down to the Galilean group and so
demotes the equivalence principle from being a symmetry principle. (An essen-
tially equivalent theory is obtained by eschewing use of a potential and simply
working with an inverse-square force law: the inverse-square force is, provably,
the gradient of the unique solution to Poisson’s equation with asymptotically
constant boundary conditions.)
What (if anything) is wrong with this restriction? Knox (2014) has argued
that it essentially corresponds to an arbitrary and unobservable split between
gravitational and inertial structure, and that seems right to me (see Wallace
(2016) for further discussion) but the present framework lets us make the point
more directly: in introducing the restriction on the boundary conditions, we
break the subsystem-recursivity of the theory. For freely-falling systems in re-
gions devoid of tidal forces are isolated subsystems, and yet they are not mod-
elled by any sector of the theory.
The careful reader may object: did I not claim that ‘isolated subsystem’
was a term of art, not something with a fixed pre-theoretic meaning? Indeed
so. And we could try defining a system as ‘isolated’ if it is moving at constant
speed with respect to the background Galilean geometry defined by the fixed
boundary condition. Knox’s concern about unobservability is now pressing, and
it too can be captured within the present framework: given an isolated system
in Newtonian mechanics according to our current definition, there are other
possible states of affairs where that system retains the same intrinsic dynamics
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while ceasing to be ‘isolated’. A reasonable condition on which systems count
as isolated is that if system X counts, and system Y is intrinsically identical to
system X, then system Y should also count; it is this condition that is violated
by our restriction on boundary conditions. (This ‘reasonable condition’ requires
the notion of intrinsic discernibility to be stated: here, as advertised earlier, we
see the interplay between subsystem-recursivity and symmetry.)
How serious is it for our theory not to be subsystem-recursive? The problem
is not that the theory is metaphysically unacceptable. Rather, it is that we
want to use the theory to study isolated subsystems of the universe (it is not
an empirically plausible cosmology, after all!) And trying to do so is unstable:
once we have established that inertially-moving systems are to be treated as
isolated, we quickly recognise that freely-falling systems also need to be treated
as isolated, since they are intrinsically indiscernible from the original class of
isolated systems. That leads us to expand the modelling capacity of our theory
by allowing more general boundary conditions; that in turn expands the sym-
metry group, and so we learn that we were wrong about the symmetries of our
theory. Not wrong in the sense that a hypothetical theory of cosmology could
not have that symmetry group, but wrong in the sense that the symmetries
of subsystems of the theory’s models, according to the theory itself, are larger
than the symmetries of the original theory.
Something similar happens in two other versions of Newtonian gravity that
have received philosophical attention, but there, from the present perspective,
the symmetry group is too large rather than too small. In the relational dy-
namics developed by Barbour and co-workers (Barbour and Bertotti (1982),
Barbour (1982); see Belot (1999), Pooley and Brown (2002), Barbour (2012)
and references therein for detailed discussion), the symmetry group is
~xn(t)→ R(t)~xn(f(t)) + ~s(t) (16)
for an arbitrary time-dependent orthogonal matrix R(t), an arbitrary smooth
bijection f : R→ R, and an arbitrary time-dependent translation ~s(t), and the
sectors are individuated by particle number and mass, with no boundary condi-
tions to consider. The actual form of the dynamics for the theory is somewhat
complicated to state and I refer readers to the references given, but it can be
summarised for our purposes by saying that a model is dynamically allowed iff it
is symmetry-related to a solution of ‘ordinary (i. e. Newtonian-potential) gravity
with total energy and angular momentum equal to zero.8
This theory fails to model its own subsystems. For given an isolated subset
of particles, their intrinsic dynamics will be that of N particles in Newtonian
gravitation, generically with a non-zero angular momentum and energy, so that
the state space of the subsystem contains states not present in Barbour’s theory.
It does not suffice just to declare by fiat that a subsystem is isolated only if its
energy and angular momentum vanish: we need to get the modal structure
of the subsystem right, and even if it in fact has zero angular momentum, it
8It is straightforward to generalise the theory so that the energy takes on some fixed and
sector-independent, but non-zero, value.
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perfectly well could have had nonzero angular momentum. Furthermore, even
for a subsystem with zero angular momentum the rotational and translational
motion of the subsystem has (extrinsic) physical meaning, but is not tracked by
the relational dynamics.
For this reason, Barbour’s relationism is not subsystem-recursive, and we
cannot interpret it in that light. It is an intrinsically cosmological theory, which
can be understood only as a model of the whole Universe. Barbour himself
recognises this, of course:
[L]ocally the predictions . . . do not differ at all from conventional
Newtonian dynamics. It is only if one has access to the entire uni-
verse that experimental verification of the Leibnizian predictions of
vanishing energy and angular momentum for the universe as a whole
becomes possible. (Barbour 1982, p.273)
If one were to adopt relational dynamics as one’s theory of the Universe as
a whole, one would still end up with ordinary Newtonian gravitation as the
correct (and subsystem-recursive) non-cosmological theory. Since in the actual
Universe relational dynamics is not empirically adequate as a cosmology (no
obvious generalisation to infinitely many particles, no dark energy, no asymp-
totically de Sitter geometry, etc. , it follows (contra Pooley and Brown (2002))
that the scientific value of relational dynamics is as a thought experiment, or a
demonstration of the logical coherence of Machian ideas, or a historical what-if.
Unlike Newtonian gravitation (which of course is widely used to this day in
physics, to model systems ranging in scale from lab experiments to galaxies),
relational dynamics does not appear to have a role modelling actually-existing
physical systems.
Somewhat similar conclusions can be drawn for our final gravitational the-
ory: Saunders’ vector relationism (Saunders (2013), though the name is coined
in Wallace (2016)). Here the symmetry group is the same as for Newtonian
potential gravity (arbitrary time-dependent spatial translations, combined with
time-independent rotations and time translations) but the sectors are individ-
uated as in Barbour’s theory, by particle masses and numbers alone. Vector
relationship, therefore, can be expected to be indeterministic (we can apply
symmetries with arbitrary time dependence whilst remaining in a sector, just
as for Barbour’s relationism), and indeed this can be read off directly from its
dynamics.
Saunders’ theory is also not subsystem-recursive (as I spell out in rather
more detail in Wallace (2016)): its isolated subsystems have center-of-mass
accelerations that are determined entirely by the matter distribution in other
subsystems, and so must be invariant under symmetries, and this breaks the
symmetry group of subsystems down to the Galilei group. (It could be made
subsystem-recursive by a finer-grained choice of sector (taking advantage of the
definitional requirement that dynamically-permissible models remain within a
sector), but this would effectively reduce it to Newtonian potential gravity.) As
such, the theory is intrinsically cosmological (as Saunders, again, recognises): in
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non-cosmological applications, we are led from vector relationism to the New-
tonian potential theory. There is, however, another interpretation of Saunders’
theory: as the dynamical reduction of Newtonian gravity. For the theory’s mod-
els do correctly describe the intrinsic dynamics of isolated subsystems. (This is
in contrast to Barbour’s theory, which fails to do so owing to the stipulations
that energy and angular momentum must vanish; no analogous stipulation holds
for Saunders.)
To conclude this discussion: subsystem recursivity is a powerful criterion
to select between different versions of Newtonian gravity which, if regarded
as cosmological, are empirically equivalent or nearly so. But the reasons for
applying that criterion are not epistemic or metaphysical, but methodological:
even if we were to choose a subsystem-non-recursive theory to model the whole
Universe, we will end up moving to the subsystem-recursive theory as long as
we want to study isolated subsystems of the universe — and in practice, the
application of the theory to these subsystems will pretty much exhaust both the
scientific evidence for, and the scientific usefulness of, the theory.
7 Conclusions
In physical practice, virtually all theories are used to model isolated subsystems
of a larger Universe (and, normally, to model even those systems only at a
certain level of analysis); they are hardly ever used as models of the Universe as a
whole. In many cases, though, including most of the wide-ranging theories used
by physicists, theories are subsystem-recursive: their models can incorporate
isolated proper subsystems which are modelled by other sectors of the same
theory, and can in turn be understood as modelling isolated subsystems of larger
systems also modellable by other sectors of the theory.
Subsystem recursivity offers a general framework to assess the epistemic,
modal and metaphysical status of the symmetry transformations of a theory, by
firstly considering symmetry transformations restricted to some subsystem of a
sector and then translating the results to sectors as a whole via subsystem re-
cursivity. When this general framework is applied to the spacetime symmetries
of nonrelativistic particle theories, the result is that any such symmetry, applied
to a subsystem, cannot be extended to a symmetry of the whole system that
leaves any other system invariant, and so spacetime symmetry transformations
give rise to extrinsically distinct and empirically distinguishable states of affairs.
Applied to the permutation symmetries of those theories, the result is subtler:
such transformations, applied to a subset of particles, can be so extended to any
other particles, and so the discernibility of states related by such a transforma-
tion cannot be witnessed by any other particles — but it can be witnessed by
earlier or later states of the same particles.
Subsystem-recursivity has implications for the interpretation of symmetries,
and in turn a clear understanding of symmetries allows a cleaner statement of
subsystem recursivity, clarifying what it is for two subsystems to be intrinsically
indiscernible and so allowing us to insist that a subsystem-recursive theory, if
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it treats a state of a system as isolated, must treat intrinsially indiscernible
states of that same system as isolated. So understood, subsystem-recursivity
has uses beyond the interpretation of symmetry, as I illustrated through an
examination of various forms of Newtonian gravity: the standard potential-
theory version is subsystem-recursive, but various alternatives — the Barbour-
Bertotti theory, Saunders’ vector relationism, and inverse-square-law gravity —
for various reasons are not. This provides a methodological argument in favor of
the potential-theory form, at least for the normal purposes for which Newtonian
gravity is used.
I hope to have demonstrated in this paper the interpretative values of this
approach to isolated systems and their symmetries, but of course my examples
remain restricted to relatively simple physical theories. In the sequel I extend
them to the more complicated situations which arise in field theory.
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